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1. Introduction 
 
“Cognition of the effect depends on and implies cognition of its cause,” announces Spinoza in 1a4 
of his Ethics.1 This axiom, known as “Spinoza’s causal axiom,” is one of the most important in the 
Ethics. It plays a central role in Spinoza’s arguments for some of his most significant doctrines, 
including (1) that things with nothing in common cannot causally interact; (2) that we have sense 
perception of the external causes of our bodily states; (3) that we have adequate knowledge of God’s 
eternal and infinite essence; and (4) that the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order 
and connection of things. It would, thus, appear that a single axiom bears a tremendous amount of 
weight in Spinoza’s metaphysical system.  
In what follows, I will explore how Spinoza uses the axiom to argue for the four doctrines 
mentioned above, and I will argue that it cannot be given a consistent interpretation that allows it to 
play all the roles that he assigns to it. In particular, whereas there is a single interpretation that makes 
sense of (1)–(3), there is no way to make the causal axiom consistent with both those three doctrines 
and the role Spinoza assigns it in securing (4). I will argue, however, that this does not present an 
insuperable problem for Spinoza, because he has a better argument for the parallelism that relies not 
on the causal axiom but rather on mode identity. I conclude by considering the underlying 
                                                 
1 In his standard translation, Edwin Curley renders involvit as involves, which is a perfectly acceptable translation of the 
word. But, as Alan Gabbey has shown, involvere was a technical term in philosophical neo-Latin that was synonymous 
with implicare, and thus implies is also an acceptable translation (see Alan Gabbey, "Spinoza, Infinite Modes and the 
Infinitive Mood," Studia Spinozana: An International and Interdisciplinary Series 16 (2008): 47-48, fn. 10.). For reasons that will 
become clear, I think this more accurately captures Spinoza’s intention. 
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philosophical motivations for the causal axiom and argue that it is an expression of a coherent and 
attractive view of the relationship between causation and causal explanation.  
 
2. No Interaction 
 
Spinoza famously denies that things that do not share an attribute can causally interact. This is a 
significant doctrine because it helps him establish that it pertains to the nature of a substance to exist 
(1p7 via 1p6), which is, in turn, crucial to all four of his arguments for the existence of God (1p11). 
His argument for it also contains the first application of the causal axiom in the Ethics. He writes: 
1p3: If things have nothing in common with one another, one of them cannot be the cause 
of the other.  
Dem.: If they have nothing in common with one another, then (by 1a5) they cannot be 
understood through one another, and so (by 1a4) one cannot be the cause of the other, 
q.e.d.  
The argument (No Interaction) can be paraphrased as follows: 
1. If two things, x and y, have nothing in common, then x and y are not understood through 
one another. (1a5) 
2. If x and y are not understood through one another, then x and y do not stand to each other 
as cause to effect. (1a4) 
3. Therefore, if x and y have nothing in common, then x and y do not stand to each other as 
cause and effect.  
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The second premise of No Interaction is justified by appeal to the causal axiom, 1a4, which means 
that we must understand it in a way that is not immediately suggested by its initial formulation. In 
particular, we must read the it as entailing:  
• If one thing causes another, then these things can be understood through one another.  
This raises the question of what kind of “understanding” is at issue in the claim that if one thing 
causes another, then they can be understood through one another. Moreover, in connection with the 
first premise of No Interaction, it is natural to wonder why Spinoza believes that it is necessary that 
things that are understood through one another, in the relevant sense, have something in common.  
The answers to these questions become clearer when we situate 1p3 into the broader 
philosophical context of Spinoza’s Ethics. Spinoza takes up the issue of interaction again in 2p5 and 
2p6. And, once again, he appeals to his causal axiom to make his case. There he appears to say that 
modes of different attributes cannot causally interact, because the concepts of modes of a given 
attribute “imply the concept of their own attribute, but not of another one” (2p6). That is, if one 
thing causes another, then their concepts are inferentially connected. Concepts are inferentially 
connected just in case they belong to the same attribute. Thus, things cause one another only if they 
can be conceived under the same attribute. But why should there be a conceptual condition on 
causation?  
The answer to this question can be found in Spinoza’s discussion of mind-body identity in 
2p7. Just after telling us that God cannot cause modes except insofar as he is considered under the 
attributes to which they belong, he says that the mind (i.e., the idea of the human body) and the 
body are one and the same thing conceived of in two different ways (2p7s). This creates the 
appearance of paradox because if God, insofar as he is thinking, causes some idea and every idea is 
identical to some body, then God, insofar as he is thinking, causes some body. Spinoza is well aware 
that his words have created the appearance of paradox and immediately addresses it. He says that he 
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denied interaction for “no other reason” than that a mode can be “perceived” only through another 
mode of the same attribute. Consequently, we must “explain” the causal order of nature through a 
single attribute at a time.2 In other words, causal explanations must be framed in terms of concepts 
that belong to a single attribute because we can only perceive the connections between things when 
we think about them using concepts that are inferentially connected to each other. This is a point 
about causal explanation and it does not require Spinoza to deny that minds and bodies can causally 
interact as they manifestly must given Spinoza’s commitment to mind-body identity. Rather he is 
denying that we can frame explanations of those interactions in terms of concepts belonging to 
more than one attribute. The barrier between the attributes is explanatory and not causal. 
This interpretation is controversial, but, unfortunately, I cannot undertake a full defense of it 
here.3 In lieu of such a defense, I will note only that my interpretation has certain advantages over its 
main rivals. Many commentators have attempted to deal with the seeming contradiction between 
Spinoza’s claims that bodies and minds don’t causally interact and that they are “one and the same 
thing” by ascribing some exotic doctrine to him, such as that the indiscernibility of identicals is 
false;4 that causation is an “intensional relation,” the holding of which depends on how things are 
conceived;5 or radical ontological pluralism.6 My interpretation, in contrast, does not impute any 
such exotic doctrine to Spinoza. The claims that causation implies causal explanation, and that causal 
explanations must be framed in terms of concepts that bear inferential connections to each other, 
although not entirely uncontroversial, are certainly less controversial than the aforementioned 
                                                 
2 2p7s. 
3 For a fuller treatment of this issue, see Martin Lin, Being and Reason: An Interpretation of Spinoza’s Metaphysics (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, forthcoming), chap. 4. 
4 See John Morrison, "Two Puzzles About Thought and Identity in Spinoza," in Spinoza’s Ethics: A Critical Guide, ed. 
Yitzhak Melamed (Cambridge: Cambridge Univesity Press, 2017). 
5 See Michael Della Rocca, Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
6 See Don Garrett, "The Indiscernibility of Identicals and the Transitivity of Identity in Spinoza’s Logic of the 
Attributes," in Spinoza's ‘Ethics': A Critical Guide, ed. Yitzhak Y. Melamed, Cambridge Critical Guides (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
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alternatives and, to this extent, my interpretation is to be preferred. Others have attempted to 
address the problem by claiming that, when Spinoza says that the mind and the body are “one and 
the same thing,” he does not mean that minds and bodies are numerically identical; rather he means 
that they are qualitatively similar and are parts of a single whole (the mind-body composite that 
constitutes the human being).7 But as Don Garrett has convincingly shown, there is no textual 
evidence that Spinoza ever uses “one and the same thing” to express anything but numerical 
identity.8 My interpretation has the advantage of allowing us to interpret “one and the same thing” in 
the most natural way as expressing numerical identity. Against my interpretation, it might be 
objected that it reads causa in Spinoza as ambiguous between expressing a metaphysical relation—
causation as such—and an epistemic relation—causal explanation. This is true, but I do not think 
that it represents a significant cost. In philosophical neo-Latin, causa is no less ambiguous between 
causation and explanation9 than ‘cause’ is in English,10 and thus, it is in no way surprising that 
Spinoza’s use of the term displays such ambiguity.  
We now see why Spinoza thinks that the causal axiom entails that if x causes y, then x and y 
can be understood through one another, and that if x and y can be understood through one another, 
then they have something in common. He believes the former claim because he believes causation 
implies explanation and he believes the latter claim because he believes that explanation requires 
conceptual connectedness, presumably because he thinks that causation is intelligible.11 Thus, two 
                                                 
7 See Colin R. Marshall, "The Mind and the Body as ‘One and the Same Thing’ in Spinoza," British Journal for the History of 
Philosophy 17, no. 5 (2009). 
8 See Garrett 2017, 22-4. 
9 See Vincent Carraud, Causa Sive Ratio : La Raison De La Cause, De Suarez À Leibniz (Paris: Presses universitaires de 
France, 2002). 
10 See Donald Davidson, "Causal Relations," Journal of Philosophy 64, no. 21 (1967); Peter F. Strawson, "Causation and 
Explanation," in Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events, ed. Bruce Vermazen and Merrill B. Hintikka (Oxford University 
Press, 1985), 115-17. 
11 I discuss these issues in more detail in Lin, forthcoming a. 
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things that do not share an attribute cannot cause one another because there is no way of conceiving 
of them such that their concepts are inferentially connected.  
It should be stressed that the claim that causation implies explanation is compatible with 
modes of different attributes standing in causal relations to one another. It is true that if we conceive 
of two modes under different attributes, then they cannot causally explain one another. However, 
Spinoza’s causal axiom only requires that if x causes y, then there is some way of conceiving x and y 
such that x causally explains y. The modes of one attribute are identical to the modes of every other 
attribute and thus for any two modes, there is a way of conceiving both under the same attribute, 
which allows us to appropriately frame causal explanations whenever causal relations obtain.  
We can summarize these results as follows. The argument of 1p3 requires us to understand 
Spinoza’s causal axiom as entailing: 
• If x and y stand in causal relations, then x and y are understood through one another.  
And given how Spinoza develops his ban on inter-attribute causal explanation in 2p5, 2p6, and 2p7s, 
we can further interpret 1a4 as entailing: 
• If c causes e, then there is some way of conceiving c and e so that c causally explains e.  
Spinoza believes that causation implies understanding because he thinks that if one thing causes 
another, then the one causally explains the other. Explanation generates understanding, and if one 
thing causes another, then the latter is understood through the former.  
It is natural to think that understanding is a relation to a subject. (This point isn’t particularly 
important for understanding No Interaction, but it will become important when we consider his 
account of sense perception, adequate cognition of the essence of God, and the parallelism, so it will 
be useful to start addressing this issue now.) Here is one way that the claim about understanding 
entailed by the causal axiom can be reformulated so as to make its relativity to a subject explicit: 
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• If x and y stand in causal relations, then there is a subject S such that S understands x and y 
through one another.  
But this formulation is unsatisfactory, because in 1a5 Spinoza treats the claim that x is understood 
through y as equivalent to the claim that x is conceived through y. However, that x is conceived 
through y does not entail that anyone has ever conceived of x, whereas the above formulation treats 
“x is understood through y” as entailing that someone understands x. (Spinoza does not establish 
that all modes are conceived until 2p3, by which time he has already argued that infinitely many 
modes which are conceived through God exist in 1p16.12) We can, however, reformulate the 
principle as follows so that it doesn’t imply that a subject actually understands: 
• If x and y stand in causal relations and there is a subject S that understands x or y, then S 
understands x and y through one another.  
This formulation does not have the unwanted consequence that if x is understood through y, then 
there is someone who understands x. Rather, it merely states that if someone understands (in the 
sense of grasping a causal explanation) a cause and its effect, then they must understand them 
through each other.  
 
3. Sense Perception 
 
Another important use of the causal axiom occurs in 2p16, which forms the basis of Spinoza’s 
account of sense perception (an account I will call “Sense Perception” hereafter). I reconstruct it as 
follows: 
                                                 
12 See John Morrison, "The Relation between Conception and Causation in Spinoza's Metaphysics," Philosophers' 
Imprint 13 (2013): 2. 
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1. The causes of a passive state of the human body are the natures of both the human body and 
certain external bodies. (2a1) 
2. If c causes e and S has an idea of e, then S has an idea of the nature of c that is implied by S’s idea 
of e. (1a4) 
3. Therefore, if S has an idea of a passive state of S’s body, then S has an idea of the natures of 
both S’s body and certain external bodies that is implied by S’s idea of the passive state.  
Spinoza argues that if we have an idea of a state with internal and external causes, then that idea 
implies an idea about those causes. When the external world impinges upon us (for example, by 
directing light rays through our eyes to our retinas, which subsequently puts our visual system in a 
certain state), we have an idea of that state. Because that state has causes, by the causal axiom, we 
have ideas of those causes, which include the external causes. Thus, we have ideas of the external 
world insofar as it causes us to be in that state.13 
In order to understand Spinoza’s argument, it will first be necessary to understand some 
elements of Spinoza’s philosophy of mind and his account of intentionality. According to Spinoza, 
every idea is identical to some body. The human mind is a complex idea that is identical to a 
complex body, and the parts of the human mind are identical to the parts of the human body. Not 
only are our ideas identical to parts of our body, but they represent them. This intentionality toward 
the body is both primitive and direct. It is primitive because it is not analyzable in terms of any other 
relation. It is direct because it does not obtain in virtue of the representation of anything else. 
Moreover, for Spinoza, the only thing that the mind can represent in this primitive and direct way is 
the body to which it is identical.  
                                                 
13 For more discussion of this argument, see Martin Lin, "Descartes and Spinoza on Judgment," in Il Seicento E 
Descartes: Dibattiti Cartesiani (2004). 
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In addition to this direct and primitive intentionality, Spinoza also holds that there is derived 
and indirect intentionality. For example, we can represent things other than our own body in virtue 
of representing our own body when the states of our body have an external cause. Such 
representation is indirect because it occurs in virtue of the representation of something else (viz., our 
own body), and it is derived because it occurs in virtue of nonrepresentation relations (viz., 
causation).14  
In Sense Perception, Spinoza is addressing a special case of indirect derived intentionality: 
the kind that occurs when the external world causes a state of our body. The causal axiom entails 
that ideas about effects imply ideas about their causes. Ideas of the states of our body that have 
external causes imply information about those causes, and thus we automatically represent those 
external causes by means of representing our body. 
There are two things worth noting that will become relevant when we compare this use of 
the causal axiom with the role the axiom is asked to play in the demonstration of the parallelism 
doctrine in 2p7d. First, the idea of e and the idea of c possessed by S need not be different ideas. 
Indeed, it is very natural to read the demonstration as saying that there is a single idea that represents 
both the effect (the passive state of the human body) and its causes. It represents them both because 
the idea of the passive state implies truths about the internal and external causes.15  
Second, the idea of the causes (the natures of both the human body and certain external 
bodies) must be possessed by the same subject that possesses the idea of the passive state. This must 
be so if 2p16 is to provide an account of sense perception. After all, if the idea of its causes implied 
by my idea of my passive state was in your mind instead of mine, I could hardly be said to enjoy 
perception of the external world in virtue of your idea.  
                                                 
14 Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 1984), 156. 
15 See ibid.; Della Rocca, 48. 
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At this point, a natural question arises about how a single axiom could support both No 
Interaction and Sense Perception. After all, causation between things that don’t share an attribute 
and perception of the external world appear, on the face of it, to be completely different topics. Let 
us begin by comparing the premises derived from the causal axiom at work in both arguments. The 
premise in No Interaction is: 
• If x and y stand in causal relations and there is a subject S that understands x or y, then S 
understands x and y through one another.  
And the premise in Sense Perception is: 
• If c causes e and there is a subject S has an idea of e, then S has an idea of the nature of c that 
is implied by S’s idea of e. 
It is clear that the two premises are not logically equivalent to each other. However, if we help 
ourselves to equivalencies that Spinoza states elsewhere, then it is possible to see the No Interaction 
premises as entailed by the Sense Perception premise. The antecedent of the No Interaction premise 
is “x and y stand in causal relations,” whereas the antecedent of the premise in Sense Perception is “c 
causes e.” The antecedent of the Sense Perception premise is stronger in that it specifies the 
direction of the causal relation whereas No Interaction is indifferent to the direction of causality. 
Moreover, Sense Perception requires a consequent that specifies the conceptual relation: the idea of 
the cause must be implied by the idea of the effect. This is clearly logically stronger than the 
consequent of the premise of No Interaction, which merely requires that some conceptual 
connection obtains. This is even clearer when we consider that 1a5 and 2d3 license us to paraphrase 
the consequent of the No Interaction premise as either “S has an idea of x that implies an idea of y or 
S has an idea of y implies an idea of x,” which is clearly entailed by the Sense Perception consequent: 
“S has an idea of the nature of x that is implied by S’s idea of e.” Thus, the Sense Perception premise 
is logically stronger than the No Interaction premise and we can derive the latter from the former.  
 11 
But is the underlying motivation the same in each case? I believe that the answer is yes. 
Spinoza’s denial of interaction is motivated by the thought that causation implies causal explanation 
and causal explanation must be framed in terms of concepts that bear inferential connections to one 
another. Similarly, the account of sense perception is motivated by the thought that representations 
of effects allow us to infer information about their causes because causes explain their effects. The 
picture of explanation assumed by No Interaction is entailed by that of Sense Perception. Thus, 
both arguments can be seen as rooted in the notion that causal explanation allows us to infer 
information about the cause from an idea of the effect. What is more, the idea that explanation 
allows us to infer information about the cause from the effect is a natural one. For example, the 
distribution of characteristics in the result of crossbreeding pea plants allowed Mendel to infer the 
existence of genes because the existence of genes explains the distribution. Spinoza thinks that such 
inferential connections require that explanations are framed in terms of concepts that belong to a 
single attribute because only such concepts are inferentially connected. Thus, No Interaction and 
Sense Perception express interlocking perspectives on the relationship between causation, causal 
explanation, and implication.  
 
4. Knowledge of God’s Essence 
 
One of the more striking theses advanced by Spinoza in the Ethics is that every idea implies adequate 
knowledge of God’s eternal and infinite essence. (I will call this thesis “Knowledge of God” 
hereafter.) That is, not only is it possible to know God, but every human mind, and indeed every 
mind whatsoever, automatically possesses this knowledge. Here too the causal axiom is in play. The 
first stage of the argument comes at 2p45 and can be summarized thus: 
 12 
1. Every singular thing is causally explained by God insofar as he is considered under the attribute 
of that thing. (1p15 and 2p6) 
2. An attribute expresses the eternal and infinite essence of God. (1d6) 
3. If c causes e, then the idea of e implies an idea of c. (1a4) 
4. Therefore, the idea of every singular thing implies the eternal and infinite essence of God.  
Spinoza next argues (in 2p46d) that such ideas of God’s essence are all adequate. Every idea 
whatsoever implies an idea of God’s essence, and, thus, such ideas of God’s essence are common to 
all and “equally in the part as in the whole.”16 What is common to all and equally in the part as in the 
whole can only be, for Spinoza, conceived of adequately (2p45). Thus, Spinoza concludes, the idea 
of God implied by every idea is adequate.  
On this basis, Spinoza infers (in 2p47d) that the human mind has adequate knowledge of 
God’s eternal and infinite essence. This conclusion sheds light on how Spinoza is using his causal 
axiom in this context. Recall that the argument for the claim that every idea implies an idea of God’s 
essence has this premise derived from the causal axiom:  
• If c causes e, then the idea of e implies an idea of c. 
The role this premise plays in eventually securing Knowledge of God requires that both the idea of e 
and the idea of c implied by it must be in the very same mind. This is because if ideas in the human 
mind implied ideas of God’s essence that were not part of the human mind, then there would be no 
sense in which the human mind would possess knowledge of God.  
Not only must the idea of c be in the same mind as the idea of e, but there are powerful 
reasons for supposing that it must be the very same idea. Every idea in the human mind has some 
part of the human body as its object. Moreover, every idea of the human body implies adequate 
                                                 
16 2p46d. 
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knowledge of God (2p46). Thus, if the human mind has knowledge of God’s essence, then there is 
an idea that constitutes that knowledge that is identical to some idea of a part of the human body. 
Therefore, there is at least one idea of a cause (i.e., an idea of God’s essence) that is identical to the 
idea of the effect (i.e., an idea of a part of the body) that implies it. It would be very surprising if 
there were one part of the human body the idea of which constituted knowledge of God and was 
implied by every other idea in the human mind. Instead, it would be much more natural to say that 
every idea implies an idea of God’s essence to which it is identical.  
  
5. Parallelism 
  
The last major use of the causal axiom that I would like to discuss is Spinoza’s use of the axiom in 
deriving his famous parallelism doctrine (Parallelism hereafter), which says, “The order and 
connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things” (2p7). From the way Spinoza 
uses the proposition in subsequent demonstrations, it is clear that he means the causal structure of 
each attribute is the same.  
Because they manifest the same causal structure, there must be the same number of bodies 
as there are minds. If there were fewer minds than bodies or vice versa, then there would be either 
unoccupied positions in one of the two structures or leftover minds or bodies that had stood in no 
causal relations. There can’t be unoccupied positions, because that would mean that there were 
causes without effects or effects without causes. And the existence of leftover bodies or minds 
would be tantamount to a structural difference insofar as the fact that there are bodies or minds that 
are not in the structure is a fact about the structure.17  
                                                 
17 Morrison offers an interesting series of arguments for the conclusion that, for Spinoza, the sameness of the causal 
structure of things implies that if things are ordered in some way, then their corresponding ideas are ordered in the same 
way, but it does not imply that if ideas are ordered in some way, then things are ordered in the same way. In particular, 
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Moreover, the way bodies and minds exemplify the same structure is constrained, according 
to Spinoza, by representation relations: every idea represents the body of which it is the structural 
analog (2p7c). Recall that Spinoza recognizes two resources of intentionality: the direct primitive 
intentionality that an idea bears to the body to which it is identical, and the indirect derived 
intentionality that an idea bears toward objects that are distinct from it. Spinoza calls the idea that 
directly and primitively represents a body the “mind” of that body. As Spinoza’s subsequent 
discussion makes clear (e.g., in 2p7s), it is direct primitive intentionality that constrains Parallelism. If 
a thing stands in causal relations, then the idea which is identical to it and represents it directly—i.e., 
its mind—stands in those same relations and not another idea that merely indirectly represents it.  
As we saw when considering No Interaction, Spinoza denies mind-body causal explanation 
on the grounds that genuine explanations must be framed in terms of concepts that bear inferential 
relations to one another and that only concepts that fall under the same attribute bear such relations. 
And yet, the mind and the body seem tightly connected. When you kick my shin, I feel pain. When I 
want a drink, I raise my hand to catch the waiter’s attention. If mind-body explanation is impossible, 
why are these events so reliably correlated? Parallelism is meant to answer this question. They are 
correlated because the causal order exemplified by the mental is the same as that of the physical. 
Spinoza’s argument for this conclusion is brief, and he cites only the causal axiom in support 
of it.  
2p7: The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.  
                                                 
Morrison suggests that 2p7 leaves open the possibility that there are more ideas than things, as well as that there are 
more connections between ideas and things. (See Morrison,  12-14.) With respect to the possibility that there are more 
ideas than things—the more important claim for my argument here—I believe that this is ruled out by 2p8c, in which 
Spinoza denies the possibility of the nonexistence of ideas that represent certain things on the basis of the nonexistence 
of those things by appeal to 2p7. For Morrison’s position to be correct, ideas that didn’t represent anything would have 
to be compatible with 2p7, which I take to be unspinozistic. This is not to say, however, that I take representation to be 
sufficient for mentality. See Martin Lin, "Spinoza and the Mark of the Mental," in Cambridge Critical Guide to Spinoza, ed. 
Yitzhak Melamed (2017). 
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Dem.: This is clear from 1a4. For the idea of each thing caused depends on the knowledge 
of the cause of which it is the effect.  
One problem with this demonstration is that the causal axiom does not entail the existence of any 
ideas. It says only that if there is an idea of an effect, then that idea implies and depends on an idea 
of the cause. Parallelism, however, requires that if there are bodies, then there are ideas. Many 
commentators, however, have seen 2p3, which says that there is an idea of everything, as supplying 
the needed premise.18 Thus, given 2p3, there is an idea of every body, and it implies and depends on 
the idea of its cause. The resulting argument could be represented as: 
1. If a body c causes a body e and there is an idea of e, then the idea of e is caused by the idea of 
c. (1a4) 
2. There is an idea of each body. (2p3) 
3. Therefore, a body e depends on a body c just in case the idea of e is caused by the idea of c. 
There are at least two problems with this argument. The first is that the argument secures the left-to-
right direction of the biconditional but not the right-to-left. For example, the right-to-left direction 
would be false if ideas of effects can depend on ideas of causes and yet the realm of thought could 
manifest a different causal structure than the realm of bodies because the effects of some ideas 
might depend upon the ideas of the causes of their objects and other ideas. Yet, such a scenario is 
not ruled out by either premise of the argument.19 This problem is, however, orthogonal to our 
present concerns, and I will set it aside.  
More pressing for us is the interpretation of the phrase “the idea of c” in premise (1). For 
Spinoza’s argument for Parallelism to be cogent, the idea of c must be the idea which constitutes the 
                                                 
18 Bennett, 130; Della Rocca, 22-23. 
19 Della Rocca 1996, 23. 
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mind of c (Spinoza is a panpsychist and believes that every body has a mind20) and which is identical 
to it. But this requires a very different understanding of the causal axiom than that employed in No 
Interaction, Sense Perception, and Knowledge of God. In No Interaction, the premise derived from 
1a4 is that if c causes e, then c causally explains e. Causal explanation, for Spinoza, requires that if a 
subject has an idea of an effect, then that idea implies an idea of its cause. But if the cause is distinct 
from the subject’s body (assuming for simplicity an extended cause), then the idea of the cause 
implied by the idea of the effect will not be the mind of the effect—that is, the idea that directly 
represents it and is identical to it. Thus, the causal axiom, insofar as No Interaction is concerned, is 
neutral as to whether the idea of the cause and the idea of the effect are numerically distinct. But if 
the idea of the cause and the idea of the effect can be numerically identical, then Spinoza cannot 
derive the conclusion that ideas and bodies are equinumerous from the causal axiom.  
Sense Perception raises a similar problem. For Sense Perception to account for our 
perception of the external world, the idea of the cause implied by the idea of the effect must not be the 
idea that is identical to the external cause. The idea of the external cause must be external to our 
mind and thus cannot be the idea in virtue of which we have sense perception. For example, I am 
currently looking out my window at a tree. Light rays bounce off the tree, irradiate my retinas, and 
put my visual system into a certain state. My mind is the idea of my body and, as such, contains an 
idea of my visual system. The idea of the tree implied by my idea of my visual system is not, 
however, the idea of the tree that directly represents it and is identical to the tree. Just as the tree is 
not part of my body, the idea that directly represents the tree is not part of my mind. Thus, Sense 
Perception demands that the causal axiom is neutral as to whether the idea of the cause and the idea 
of the effect are numerically distinct. 
                                                 
20 See Martin Lin, "Spinoza’s Panpsychism," in The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism, ed. William Seager (New Yrok: 
Routledge, forthcoming). 
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If the causal axiom by itself cannot deliver numerical distinctness between the idea of the 
cause and the idea of the effect, does Spinoza have other commitments that could force their 
distinctness in the case of Parallelism? The identity of the idea of the cause and the idea of the effect 
is made possible in Sense Perception by the fact that ideas, for Spinoza, can have multiple contents. 
In Sense Perception, the mind has ideas with multiple contents in virtue of representing states of the 
body that contain information about the external world. Thus, the idea of the effect and the idea of 
the cause are one and the same. However, if God’s idea of the cause and his idea of the effect could 
be one and the same idea, as they are in the case of human sense perception, then Parallelism would 
not follow. For example, it would be enough to satisfy the causal axiom if God had an idea of the 
state of our visual system and did not have an independent idea of the external factors that explain 
that state. Thus, there would be fewer ideas than bodies, contrary to 2p7.  
We might try to rule this out by appealing to the mind-relativity of content and showing that 
although the idea of a passive state of our body represents its external causes relative to our mind, 
those same ideas do not represent those external causes relative to God’s mind. This line of defense 
would start with the observation that, for Spinoza, insofar as an idea constitutes the human mind or 
part of the human mind, it can have two contents.21 The first is the content it has in virtue of the 
primitive intentionality directed at the object with which it is identical—an intentionality that every 
idea exhibits. As we saw in our discussion of sense perception, there can also be another content, 
relative to the human mind, that represents the external causes of the states of the body. However, 
according to Spinoza, insofar as an idea represents the nature of external bodies in addition to the 
nature of the body with which it is identical, an idea is inadequate (2p25). No idea, however, is 
inadequate insofar as it is in God’s mind. Thus, ideas have one set of contents relative to the human 
mind and a different set of contents relative to God’s mind.  
                                                 
21 Here I am relying on Della Rocca, chap. 3.  
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In the case of sense perception, the idea of the cause cannot be the idea that represents the 
cause directly and is identical to it, because that would be an idea of an external cause. Thus, it must 
be an idea in the human mind that is identical to the idea of some part of the human body and that 
directly represents the human body and indirectly represents the external cause. This idea is 
inadequate because, for Spinoza, an idea is inadequate relative to a mind just in case it has causes 
that are not part of that mind.22  
One might conclude from this that God cannot have an idea of the external cause of a state 
of my body by having an idea of my body, because, in the human mind, such ideas are inadequate 
and all ideas insofar as they are part of God’s mind are adequate. But remember that an idea is 
inadequate relative to a mind just in case its causes are not part of that mind. If God had an idea of, 
for example, the tree that I am looking at by having an idea of my visual system, then that idea 
would not be inadequate, because the external cause of that idea would be part of God’s mind. 
Thus, while the idea of the tree would be adequate in God’s mind and inadequate in mine, both 
ideas could be indirect.23 We cannot, therefore, rule out the possibility that ideas and bodies are not 
equinumerous on the basis of the mind-relativity of content.  
Similar considerations bear on Knowledge of God. As we have seen, every idea in the 
human mind indirectly represents the essence of God. Moreover, the ideas that represent this 
essence constitute adequate knowledge of that essence. As we have seen, the most natural 
interpretation of this doctrine is that every idea in the human mind is identical to an adequate idea of 
God’s essence. Thus, here too, the causal axiom must be neutral on whether the idea of the cause 
implied by the idea of the effect and the idea of the effect itself are identical. Parallelism, however, 
requires that they be distinct, because it requires that the number of bodies and the number of ideas 
                                                 
22 2p24d. 
23 Della Rocca claims that God does not have ideas that represent indirectly, but his arguments presuppose the 
parallelism and thus would beg the question under discussion. See Della Rocca, 44-46. 
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be the same. Thus, Parallelism needs more than the causal axiom can deliver, even in conjunction 
with the claim that there is an idea of every body.  
 
6. Implication, Dependence, and the Case for Two Axioms 
 
The problem discussed above with respect to Sense Perception and Knowledge of God points to a 
related conflict between implication and causal dependence in the causal axiom. The causal axiom 
says that ideas of effects imply and causally depend on ideas of causes. One notion, implication, 
concerns rational inference, and another, causal dependence, concerns metaphysical structure. The 
difference between Parallelism and all the other uses so far considered is that it invokes the relation 
of causal dependence and not implication, while the others all invoke implication and not causal 
dependence. The causal axiom, however, doesn’t say that cognitions of effects imply or causally 
depend on cognitions of causes, but rather says that every cognition of effects bears both relations to 
cognitions of causes. How do things look if we make both relations salient in every context in which 
the causal axiom plays a role? 
Let’s start with Sense Perception. We saw that ideas of states of our bodies with external 
causes afford us sense perception of those causes in virtue of carrying information about them. 
Thus, the idea of the effect (e.g., the state of our visual system) is the idea of the cause (the external 
bodies which affect our visual system). How then can the idea of the effect causally depend on the 
idea of the cause when they are one and the same idea? There are three main options: (1) The idea of 
the visual system and the idea of the external cause of its state are one and the same idea. This idea 
causally depends on itself—i.e., it’s self-caused. (2) The idea of the external cause is the idea of the 
object of which it is the external cause and is identical to it. (3) The idea of external cause is neither 
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the idea of the visual system nor the idea identical with the external causes of the state of the visual 
system but a third idea.  
Option (1) is clearly out of the question. Modes are conceived through others in which they 
inhere (1d5). For Spinoza, one thing inheres in another just in case it is not self-caused.24 Thus, 
modes are not self-caused. Moreover, option (1) is incompatible with the hypothesis that the idea of 
the state of the visual system has an external cause. If the idea of the external cause is self-caused 
and it is identical to the idea of the state of the visual system, then the idea of the state of the visual 
system is self-caused. But then the idea of the visual system is both self-caused and not self-caused. 
Option (2) is ruled out, because, as previously discussed, the idea of the external causes gives 
us sense perception only if it is part of our minds. But an idea is identical to an external cause only if 
it is not part of our minds. Again, on this scenario I would have sense perception of, for example, 
the tree outside my window because someone else has an idea of the tree, which is clearly an 
inadequate account of sense perception. 
The only remaining option is (3), but there is no plausible candidate for being an idea in our 
mind that (a) is identical neither to the effect nor to the cause, (b) still represents the external cause, 
and (c) is such that the idea of the effect depends on it. The effect is a state of the visual system. 
What other idea in the human body could be the idea of the cause? Perhaps there is a state of the 
brain not part of the visual system that is an output of the visual system—for example, a state of the 
prefrontal cortex—that encodes information about the external causes. But if so, it is not the cause 
of the state of the visual system; rather it is an effect of the visual system. Thus, it fails to satisfy (c); 
it is not such that the idea of the effect depends on it. 
The three options just considered by no means exhaust the logical space. For example, it is 
logically possible that the idea in the prefrontal cortex and the idea of the state of the visual system 
                                                 
24 1d3, 1d5, 1a1, 1a4, and 1p4d.  
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mutually cause one another. But this is incompatible with the natural assumption that the kind of 
causation at issue here is asymmetric. Fire causes smoke, but smoke does not cause fire. There are, 
no doubt, other logically possible scenarios, but, as far as I can see, none of them are plausible as 
accounts of sense perception, and so we cannot appeal to them in making the dependence clause of 
the causal axiom consistent with Sense Perception.  
Similar problems arise for knowledge of God’s essence in the human mind. The idea which 
constitutes our knowledge of God must be an idea in the human mind. Spinoza argues that this idea 
is adequate because it is common to all and equally in the part as in the whole (2p46). This 
universality entails that every idea in the human mind, and the human mind itself, implies an idea of 
God’s eternal and infinite essence. But every idea in the human mind directly represents a part of the 
human body, and the human mind itself is an idea that directly represents the human body. For this 
reason, our idea of God’s essence must be identical to some idea of our body. Thus, there is at least 
one idea in the human mind that both is identical to and implies an idea of God’s essence. Indeed, as 
I argued earlier, the most natural assumption is that every idea in the human mind both is identical 
to and implies an idea of God’s essence. But no idea can both imply and causally depend on an idea 
of God understood in this way, on pain of self-causation. 
These considerations show that the causal dependence clause and the implication clause of 
the causal axiom are in conflict with each another. Because Spinoza only appeals to implication in 
No Interaction, Sense Perception, and Knowledge of God, and only appeals to causal dependence in 
the Parallelism, it would appear that there are not one but two causal axioms that are, in the context 
of Spinoza’s system, incompatible with each another. One axiom says that cognition of an effect 
implies cognition of the cause and supports No Interaction, Sense Perception, and Knowledge of 
God but not Parallelism. Another axiom says that cognition of an effect causally depends on 
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cognition of its cause and supports the Parallelism but conflicts with Sense Perception and 
Knowledge of God. Spinoza can have, at most, one of these axioms.25  
Fortunately for Spinoza, there is a simple solution to this problem. The implication version 
of the axiom is indispensable to No Interaction, Sense Perception, and Knowledge of God, but the 
causal dependence version is eminently dispensable when it comes to Parallelism because, as we 
have seen, the dependence version of the causal axiom, even when supplemented with additional 
Spinozistic doctrines, fails to secure it. Spinoza, however, has an independent argument for 
Parallelism that is more successful and does not rely on the causal axiom. In the scholium to 2p7, 
Spinoza writes:  
[W]hatever can be perceived by an infinite intellect as constituting the essence of substance 
pertains to one substance only, and consequently […] the thinking substance and the 
extended substance are one and the same substance, which is now comprehended under 
this attribute, now under that. So also, a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are 
one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways. […] Therefore, whether we conceive 
nature under the attribute of Extension, or under the attribute of Thought, or under any 
other attribute, we shall find one and the same order, or one and the same connection of 
causes, i.e., that the same things follow one another.  
This argument raises many fascinating questions about the nature of the attributes and their relation 
to the one substance; I cannot, unfortunately, address those questions here.26 It is clear, however, 
that Spinoza maintains that every idea is identical to some body and that every body is identical to 
some idea. He infers from this that the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and 
                                                 
25 Although she doesn’t develop the observation, Margret Wilson is perhaps the first to suspect that tension between the 
implication clause and the dependence clause might prevent a unified interpretation of 1a4. See Wilson 1999, 160. 
26 See Lin, forthcoming a, chap. 4. 
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connection of things. This is obviously a valid inference and does not appeal to any version of the 
causal axiom.27  
Spinoza cannot have both the implication and the causal dependence versions of the causal 
axiom. He needs the implication version (for No Interaction, Sense Perception, and Knowledge of 
God) but does not need the causal dependence version, even for the one doctrine whose argument 
appeals to it (Parallelism), because he can secure it on an alternative basis (mode identity). It is clear, 
then, how this tension should be resolved: Spinoza ought to retain the implication version of his 
causal axiom and relinquish the dependence version. 
 
7. Comparison with Previous Interpretations 
 
Some commentators have thought that Spinoza’s causal axiom is restricted in some way. For 
example, Guéroult and Loeb28 have argued that it is restricted to adequate cognition, and Morrison 
has argued that it is restricted to immanent causation.29 As Margaret Wilson has persuasively argued, 
the causal axiom cannot be restricted to adequate cognition, because two of Spinoza’s most 
significant applications of the axiom are found in Sense Perception, which concerns inadequate 
cognition, and Knowledge of God, which says that all of our ideas, including inadequate ones, imply 
knowledge of God.30 My interpretation respects Wilson’s insight and is not restricted to adequate 
cognition.  
                                                 
27 Yitzhak Melamed argues that there are two parallelism doctrines: one presented in 2p7 that concerns things and ideas 
and one in 2p7s that concerns modes of different attributes but not modes of the same attribute. If this were so, then 
2p7s cannot be used to rescue the first parallelism. But Melamed’s interpretation is not correct, because Spinoza applies 
2p7s to modes of the same attribute in 2p21s. See Yitzhak Melamed, Spinoza’s Metaphysics: Substance and Thought (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), chap. 5. 
28 Martial Guéroult, Spinoza, 2 vols. (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1968), I/96-97; Louis E. Loeb, From Descartes to Hume : 
Continental Metaphysics and the Development of Modern Philosophy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981), 160. 
29 See Morrison 2015. 
30 Margaret Dauler Wilson, "Spinoza's Causal Axiom," in Ideas and Mechanism: Essays on Early Modern Philosophy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1999), 158. 
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A more challenging case is Morrison’s claim that the axiom is restricted to immanent 
causation. An immanent cause, for Spinoza, is a cause in which the effect inheres, which contrasts 
with transitive causes in which the effect does not inhere in the cause. Thus, if a substance causes a 
mode, the substance is an immanent cause of the mode, and if a mode causes a mode that doesn’t 
inhere in it (for example, when the external environment causes my visual system to be in a certain 
state), then the former is the transitive cause of the latter. Such a restriction seems to conflict with 
Sense Perception, but Morrison offers an ingenious reconstruction of it according to which the 
axiom requires only that we have cognition of the immanent cause of our states—that is, our own 
nature. Because he thinks that Spinozistic natures include dispositions such as being disposed to be 
in a certain state only if our environment contains certain features, we can infer information about 
our environment from our present state and our own nature.31 I do not object to this gloss on Sense 
Perception, but I would argue that it does not show that the axiom is restricted to immanent 
causation. Rather, if correct, it shows that cognition of transitive causes is acquired indirectly by 
means of cognition of immanent causes. In other words, Morrison’s interpretation does not show 
that Spinoza’s causal axiom is restricted to immanent causes so much as it gives an account of how 
we acquire cognition of transitive causes.  
According to Jonathan Bennett, Spinoza’s causal axiom is a “version or a part of causal 
rationalism,” by which he means the doctrine according to which the relation between cause and 
effect is the same relation that a conclusion bears to premises in a logically valid argument.32 In 
contrast, on my interpretation, in No Interaction, Sense Perception, and Knowledge of God, the 
causal axiom entails that if we have an idea of the effect, we can infer what the cause is on the basis 
of the explanatory connections that obtain between cause and effect, which is compatible with the 
                                                 
31 John Morrison, "Restricting Spinoza's Causal Axiom," Philosophical Quarterly 65, no. 258 (2015): 57-62. 
32 Bennett, 30 and 127. 
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relationship between cause and effect being different from the relationship between premises and 
conclusion. This is because, first of all, explanatory inferences need not be underwritten by logical 
entailments. For example, if the evidence implicates the criminal, we can infer the identity of the 
criminal from the evidence although it does not logically entail it.33 Second, logical entailment need 
not be explanatory, and we cannot, as a general matter, legitimately infer premises from conclusions. 
For example, p&q entails p but we cannot infer p&q from p.  
In another respect, however, my interpretation is similar to Bennett’s in that he also claims 
that there are two distinct versions of the causal axiom. But, on his interpretation, the difference 
between the two axioms is that one is logical (concerns relations between concepts understood as 
abstract) and the other psychological (concerns ideas and minds). Wilson complains against Bennett 
that this begs the question of the difference between logical and psychological entities and relations 
in Spinoza’s philosophy of mind.34 On my interpretation, however, Wilson’s scruples are irrelevant, 
because no matter how the line between the logical and the psychological is drawn, the conflict 
between implication and causal dependence is irresolvable.  
It is often assumed that the causal axiom says that x causes y just in case y is conceived 
through x. Contrary to this interpretation, Morrison has recently argued that the causal axiom says 
that x causes y only if y is conceived through x, but it does not say that if y is conceived through x, 
then x causes y. He further maintains that not only is the claim that conception implies causation not 
an important doctrine for Spinoza, but he would probably reject it.35 None of my reconstructions of 
Spinoza’s arguments make use of the claim that if y is conceived through x, then x causes y, and thus 
my interpretation is, to this extent, consistent with Morrison’s. And that none of Spinoza’s most 
significant doctrines presuppose that conception implies causation lends some credence to 
                                                 
33 See Garrett 2017, 195. 
34 Wilson, 154. 
35 Morrison, "The Relation between Conception and Causation in Spinoza's Metaphysics," 2. 
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Morrison’s claim that if Spinoza does accept that conception implies causation, it is not an important 
doctrine for him. Moreover, what I take to be the principle motivation behind Spinoza’s causal 
axiom (that causation implies causal explanations and that such explanations license inferences from 
thoughts about the effect to thoughts about the cause) does not require that it is impossible to 
conceive of one thing through another unless the former is caused by the latter.  
 
8. Conclusion: Causation, Explanation, and Implication 
 
The underlying philosophical motivations of Spinoza’s causal axiom have been a source of 
controversy among scholars. One reason for this, on my reading of 1a4, is that Spinoza derives two 
distinct principles from it. One of these principles, the implication version of the axiom, has an 
important role in Spinoza’s system, and the other, the causal dependence version, I have argued, 
cannot even play the limited role that it is called upon to do.  
  Not only does the causal dependence version fail to play its role, it is difficult to find any 
compelling philosophical motivation for it. Apart from Spinoza’s mind-body identity thesis, there is 
no independent reason to think that thoughts about effects are caused by thoughts about their 
causes. This is the sort of tendentious metaphysical claim for which we would like an argument and 
not something that even a sympathetic reader is likely to grant as an axiom.  
The implication version, however, has a clear philosophical motivation: Spinoza thinks that 
there is no causation without causal explanation. But in order for these explanations to be 
perspicuous, they must be framed in terms of concepts that bear inferential relations. Thus, 
causation implies explanation, which, in turn, implies implication. In other words, if c causes e, then 
the idea of e implies the idea of c. The concepts that pertain to one attribute bear no inferential 
connections to concepts that pertain to another; thus, two substances that don’t share an attribute 
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cannot causally interact, because the lack of inferential connections between the concepts that apply 
to them precludes explanations regarding their causal interactions. Similarly, if a state of our body 
has an external cause, then there is an explanatory relation between them that allows us to infer its 
cause from the idea of the state. And because we are modes of God, there must be explanatory 
connections between our minds and God that allow us to infer the nature of God from the nature 
and condition of our minds.  
Spinoza causal axiom is thus a complex principle that is, in the context of his system, at war 
with itself. It entails one principle about implication and another about causal dependence. As we 
have seen, the principle concerning implication is an important doctrine that is essential to No 
Interaction, Sense Perception, and Knowledge of God and has a clear and appealing philosophical 
motivation. In contrast, the principle concerning causal dependence fails in the one job it is asked to 
do—secure Parallelism—and lacks any compelling motivation. What is more, given his other 
commitments, the causal dependence principle and the implication principle cannot both be true. 
We must conclude that the clause about causal dependence in the causal axiom was a misstep and 
Spinoza would do well by rejecting it. An axiom that merely said that cognition of the cause is 
implied by cognition of the effect would provide Spinoza everything he needs while protecting him 
from the disastrous consequences of his original formulation.  
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Abbreviations 
References to Spinoza are from Gebhardt (ed.), Opera. Translations into English are taken from 
Curley’s translations in Spinoza, The Collected Works, 2 vols., with occasional modifications.  
Passages of the Ethics are cited in the following way: 
 
app appendix 
a axiom  
c  corollary  
d  demonstration or definition, depending on context 
p  proposition  
s  scholium  
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